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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 
 





Howard, Chief Judge, 
Lipez and Thompson, Circuit Judges. 
  
 
 Juan M. Frontera-Suau, with whom Kenneth Colon and Frontera 
Suau Law Offices, PSC were on brief. 
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and O'Neill & Borges LLC were on brief. 
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.  Today's opinion is a lesson 
straight out of the school of hard knocks.  No matter how 
sympathetic the plaintiff or how harrowing his plights, the law is 
the law and sometimes it's just not on his side.  See Medina–
Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 138 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Turner v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 292 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 
1961) (Wisdom, J.) ("[H]ard as our sympathies may pull us, our 
duty to maintain the integrity of the substantive law pulls 
harder.")  
Stage Setting 
Plaintiff, Victor A. Sepúlveda-Vargas ("Sepúlveda"), 
sued Defendant, Caribbean Restaurants, LLC ("Caribbean"), alleging 
a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or the 
"Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., which prohibits discrimination 
against a "qualified individual," see id. § 12112(a), "relevantly 
defined as a person 'who, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
can perform the essential functions' of [his] job[.]"  Lang v. 
Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 454 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).   Caribbean, which operates the 
Burger King franchise throughout Puerto Rico, had previously 
employed Sepúlveda as an assistant manager.  In 2011, while 
Sepúlveda was attempting to make a bank deposit on behalf of 
Caribbean, he was attacked at gunpoint, hit over the head, and had 
his car stolen.  He suffered, as a result, from post-traumatic 
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stress disorder and major depression disorder.  In response to 
these diagnoses, Sepúlveda requested that Caribbean provide him 
with a fixed work schedule (as opposed to a rotating one) and that 
it move him to a Burger King location in an area not prone to 
crime.  That is, Sepúlveda asked Caribbean, which schedules all of 
its managers such that they rotate among three distinct work shifts 
(one from 6:00am to 4:00pm, another from 10:00am to 8:00pm, and 
the last from 8:00pm to 6:00am), to assign him to one specific 
timeslot consistently.  While Caribbean initially acquiesced to 
this request, it thereafter informed Sepúlveda that he would have 
to go back to working rotating shifts.  Eventually, in 2013, 
Sepúlveda resigned from his position with Caribbean.   
At the district court below, Sepúlveda argued that 
although Caribbean recognized he was disabled within the 
definition of the ADA, it (1) failed to reasonably accommodate him 
by permanently providing him with a fixed work schedule as opposed 
to one comprised of rotating shifts and (2) that employees of 
Caribbean engaged in a series of retaliatory actions against him 
as a result of his request for a reasonable accommodation, thus 
creating a hostile work environment.1   The district court weighed 
                                                 
1 Sepúlveda also originally brought separate claims of 
discrimination under Puerto Rico law.  Because the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Caribbean on the both of the 
federal ADA claims, it declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the remaining Puerto Rico-based claims and 
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both sides' arguments, ultimately concluding that Sepúlveda was 
not a "qualified individual" under the ADA and that the supposedly 
retaliatory acts comprising his hostile work environment claim 
were insufficient to support his claim.  It therefore granted 
Caribbean's summary judgment motion, a decision from which 
Sepúlveda appeals.  We now affirm.   
Standard of Review 
Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, we 
construe the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, 
resolving all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.  See 
Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008).  In 
doing so, we will uphold summary judgment where "the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(a), and will reverse "only if, after reviewing the facts and 
making all inferences in favor of the non-moving party [here, 
Sepúlveda], the evidence on record is 'sufficiently open-ended to 
permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of 
either side.'"  Maymí v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 
F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 
                                                 
dismissed those without prejudice.  Sepúlveda makes no challenge 
here to their dismissal.   
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Discussion 
In general, for purposes of bringing a failure to 
accommodate claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) 
he is a handicapped person within the meaning of the Act; (2) he 
is nonetheless qualified to perform the essential functions of the 
job (with or without reasonable accommodation); and (3) the 
employer knew of the disability but declined to reasonably 
accommodate it upon request.  See Lang, 813 F.3d at 454.  The 
district court's focus below (and the parties' focus in their 
briefs on appeal) revolves around the second of those three 
factors, namely, whether in light of Sepúlveda's requested 
accommodation to be assigned fixed shifts he was still qualified 
to perform the essential job functions required of Caribbean 
assistant managers.  An essential function is one that is 
"fundamental" to a position.  See Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 
55 (1st Cir. 2001).  "The term does not include 'marginal' tasks, 
but may encompass 'individual or idiosyncratic characteristics' of 
the job."  Id. (quoting Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 
209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2000)).   Unsurprisingly, we have 
explained that "the complex question of what constitutes an 
essential job function involves fact-sensitive considerations and 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis."  Gillen v. Fallon 
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir. 2002).  In making 
this case-by-case determination, the ADA instructs us to give 
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consideration "to the employer's judgment as to what functions of 
a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written 
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the 
job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential 
functions of the job." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).  And the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") implementing 
regulations of the Act further tell us that beyond the employer's 
judgment, things to be considered include (but are not limited to) 
factors like "[t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to 
perform the function[,]" "[t]he work experience of past incumbents 
in the job[,]" and "[t]he current work experience of incumbents in 
similar jobs."  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).  Such considerations are 
not meant "to enable courts to second-guess legitimate business 
judgments, but, rather, to ensure that an employer's asserted 
requirements are solidly anchored in the realities of the 
workplace, not constructed out of whole cloth."  Gillen, 283 F.3d 
at 25.   
Here, the district court fully considered these factors 
and concluded that being able to work rotating shifts was an 
essential function of the assistant manager job with Caribbean.  
First, the court pointed out that it was uncontested that from 
Caribbean's perspective, the ability to work rotating shifts was 
essential.  Indeed, Caribbean explained that rotating shifts were 
necessary for the equal distribution of work among the managerial 
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staff and Sepúlveda conceded this point in his deposition.  That 
is to say, accommodating Sepúlveda permanently would have had the 
adverse impact of inconveniencing all other assistant managers who 
would have to work unattractive shifts in response to Sepúlveda's 
fixed schedule.  We have previously explained that such 
"idiosyncratic characteristics as scheduling flexibility" should 
be considered when determining the essentiality of a job function.  
Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 22 (1st Cir. 
2004); see also Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 
1998).2  The court also explained that Sepúlveda admitted in his 
deposition that rotating shifts was a responsibility he had at 
Caribbean and that this was the case for all other assistant 
managers.  Moreover, the court noted that the job application 
Sepúlveda filled out and signed when he was hired made clear that 
                                                 
2 On appeal, Sepúlveda argues that the district court's 
reliance on Laurin v. Providence Hospital was erroneous because 
that case was decided on materially distinguishable facts.  Laurin 
involved a hospital's rotating shifts requirement for nurses 
working in a 24-hour maternity ward.  Id. at 59.  Given that 
setting, we had little difficulty in concluding that the rotating 
shifts requirement was essential.  As we explained, "[m]edical 
needs and emergencies . . . do not mind the clock, let alone staff-
nurse convenience," and "to suggest otherwise would be tantamount 
to maintaining that night work is not an 'essential function' of 
a night watchman's job, even though that is the only time the 
premises are not otherwise occupied."  Id.  Though we agree with 
Sepúlveda that Laurin provides a more clear cut example of an 
"essential" rotating shifts requirement, the district court's 
citation to the case does not undermine its otherwise sound 
conclusion that Caribbean's rotating shifts requirement was also 
an essential job function. 
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all Caribbean managerial employees had to be able to work different 
shifts in different restaurants.  And it pointed to a newspaper 
advertisement for the job that listed the need to work rotating 
shifts as a requirement.  While the court did note that Caribbean 
initially granted Sepúlveda the accommodation on a temporary 
basis, that fact did "not mean that it conceded that rotating 
shifts was a 'non-essential' function."  Sepúlveda-Vargas v. 
Caribbean Restaurants LLC, No. CV 13-1622 (SEC), 2016 WL 8710980, 
at *5 (D.P.R. Sept. 30, 2016).  And we agree.  "To find otherwise 
would unacceptably punish employers from doing more than the ADA 
requires, and might discourage such an undertaking on the part of 
employers."  Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 26 (1st 
Cir. 2001).3 
                                                 
3 Oddly, Sepúlveda seems to think that Phelps is inapplicable 
to the instant case because it relied in part on the logic of a 
Seventh Circuit case, Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919 (7th 
Cir. 2001), that has slightly distinguishable facts from the those 
found here.  This argument is strange to us; Phelps says what it 
says and, regardless of the underlying facts of a Seventh Circuit 
case cited in Phelps, we see no reason how its general admonishment 
against punishing an employer for going above and beyond that 
required under the ADA is irrelevant to the case at hand.  But, 
for the sake of thoroughness, we will briefly entertain Sepúlveda's 
argument.  At core, Sepúlveda appears to believe the following.  
In Basith, an employer granted an accommodation purportedly 
requested by an employee under the ADA.  In doing so, however, the 
employer stated, "[a]lthough this is a change in the job functions, 
which is not required, I will agree to it."  Basith, 241 F.3d at 
930.  That is, the employer knew the employee was not a "qualified 
individual" under the ADA and chose to make a temporary 
accommodation for him in spite of this fact.  Because, here, 
Caribbean's impetus for granting the temporary accommodation was 
its mistaken belief that it was required to do so by the ADA,  
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As for Sepúlveda's retaliation claim, the ADA forbids 
retaliation "against any individual because such individual has 
opposed any act or practice made unlawful . . . or because such 
individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the 
ADA]."   42 U.S.C. § 12203.  These sorts of claims "may succeed 
even where [a] disability claim fails."  Valle-Arce v. P.R. Ports 
Auth., 651 F.3d 190, 198 (1st Cir. 2011).  To establish a prima 
facie claim of retaliation, it is incumbent for a plaintiff to 
show that he was engaged in protected conduct, that he was subject 
to an adverse employment action, and that there was a causal 
connection between the adverse employment action and the conduct.  
See Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 106 
(1st Cir. 2007).  Not all retaliatory actions, however, suffice to 
meet the ADA's anti-retaliation provision.  Rather, "a plaintiff 
must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 
challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means 
it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
                                                 
Sepúlveda believes (for reasons that are unclear) that this renders 
the logic of Basith and Phelps irrelevant.  Not so.  Sepúlveda 
cites no case (and we can find none) that requires this kind of 
"intent to go above and beyond the ADA" in order to apply the logic 
of Phelps and, importantly, we provided no such caveat when we 
decided Phelps.  To the contrary, this Court only held that 
evidence of non-required accommodations will not be used against 
a company in determining what is or isn't an essential job 
function, without mention of whether the employer meant to go above 
and beyond the ADA.  
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supporting a charge of discrimination."  Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto 
Rico, 464 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).  Indeed, we 
have explained that "[f]or retaliatory action to be material, it 
must produce 'a significant, not trivial harm,'" Colón-Fontánez v. 
Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 36 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Carmona-Rivera, 464 F.3d at 20), and that "actions like 'petty 
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will 
not [normally] create such deterrence.'"  Id. at 36-37 (quoting 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68) (alteration in 
original).   
At the district court--and again in his briefs filed 
with us--Sepúlveda argued that the following actions were 
materially adverse: (1) he was scolded by his direct supervisor 
for requesting an accommodation from Caribbean's human resources 
department even though the direct supervisor had already denied 
it; (2) his direct supervisor allegedly accused him of taking four 
pills of unnecessary medication, which made him feel embarrassed; 
(3) his direct supervisor attempted to briefly change Sepúlveda's 
schedule so he could attend a required managers' seminar and the 
supervisor articulated that he did not believe Sepúlveda had a 
serious medical condition when Sepúlveda tried to get out of 
attending the seminar; (4) he was forced to pull down his pants in 
front of a restaurant manager to show that he had a skin condition 
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requiring medical treatment; (5) his direct supervisor and other 
employees called him a "cry baby" on three occasions; (6) he was 
forced to take a paid vacation until he passed a health safety 
examination Caribbean required and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
highly recommends, even though he had been working with an expired 
license for some time; (7) he was told to stay past his shift's 
end until 11:00pm on one occasion and was admonished when he failed 
to abide by this instruction; and (8) he was generally treated 
differently than other assistant managers in his working hour 
requirements and labor assignments.  He also argued that even if 
any of these individual actions were not materially adverse, they 
certainly rose to that level when looked at collectively and that 
together they also amounted to a hostile work environment.   
The court below found that none of the actions Sepúlveda 
argued to be adverse were--taken on their own--material.  For 
example, the court explained while it was true that being 
reprimanded by his supervisor for going behind his back to Human 
Resources for an accommodation and being "accused" of taking four 
pills was "linked to a protected activity," each incident was 
"insufficient to sustain an adverse employment action."  
Sepúlveda-Vargas, 2016 WL 8710980, at *6.  The court explained, 
that the fact "[the supervisor] may have been angered and 
overreacted because Sepúlveda went over his head to request 
accommodation, 'while perhaps improper, does not by itself 
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constitute and adverse employment action for a retaliation 
claim.'"  Id. (quoting De Jesus-Sánchez v. Taber Partners I, LLC, 
551 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.P.R. 2007)).  As for Sepúlveda's 
argument that making a temporary change to his schedule so that he 
could attend a required managers' seminar was an adverse action, 
the district court explained that even if "[the supervisor's] 
approach [by saying he didn't believe Sepúlveda had an ailment] 
may have been somewhat rude or insensitive, 'a supervisor's 
unprofessional managerial approach and accompanying efforts to 
assert her authority are not the focus of the discrimination 
laws.'"  Id. at *7 (quoting Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del 
Caribe Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 47 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also Colón-
Fontánez, 660 F.3d at 45 (explaining that accusations of being a 
"hypochondriac" and "faking it" though uncomfortable "do not rise 
to the level of severity or pervasiveness" to sustain a retaliation 
claim).  The court also rejected Sepúlveda's assertion that he was 
forced, on one occasion, to pull down his pants to reveal a medical 
skin condition.  Not only did Sepúlveda fail to "provide sufficient 
details surrounding this incident," but he additionally failed to 
demonstrate how he was "forced" to do so or "explain how his 
supervisor's disbelief regarding a condition for which he had 
requested no accommodation nor provided any medical evidence 
before was related to a protected activity."  Sepúlveda-Vargas, 
2016 WL 8710980, at *7.  The court next rejected Sepúlveda's notion 
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that being called a "cry baby" was an adverse action.  Sepúlveda 
alleged that he was told by one employee that she had heard someone 
else call him a "cry baby" and further alleged that he had 
personally heard two other employees call him the same.  The court 
rejected the first allegation as hearsay within hearsay.  As for 
the latter two, it explained that while "it is unclear whether 
these statements were related to a protected activity or to some 
other workplace issue," even assuming it was connected to a 
protected event, "[t]he case law is clear that 'simple teasing, 
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely 
serious)' do not amount to adverse employment action, not even to 
establish an objectively hostile or abusive work environment."  
Id. (quoting Colón-Fontánez, 660 F.3d at 44).  
The remaining assertions by Sepúlveda regarding supposed 
adverse actions were all determined to be similarly unmeritorious.  
The court concluded that Caribbean's placement of Sepúlveda on 
forced paid vacation was not adverse, particularly where it was 
mandated because Sepúlveda had an expired health certificate and 
Caribbean could get in trouble with the Puerto Rico Department of 
Health if Sepúlveda did not pass the required examinations for the 
certificate.  Id. at *7-8.  And the fact that Sepúlveda was on one 
occasion told to stay past his shift's end until 11:00pm and was 
reprimanded when he defied the instruction was also not tantamount 
to an adverse employment action.  The restaurant Sepúlveda worked 
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at had been closed by the Puerto Rico Department of Health due to 
a cockroach infestation and Caribbean required all managers to 
stay late on that occasion to ensure the restaurant was properly 
cleaned.  This in and of itself is not adverse and, to the extent 
Sepúlveda may have been treated especially harshly for defying the 
instruction to stay until 11:00pm, the court noted that he 
"provide[d] no details regarding the severity of the alleged 
admonishment and his disciplinary record was not affected."  Id.  
Next, the court explained that though "Sepúlveda timidly floats 
the idea that he was subject to differential treatment in working 
hours' requirements, in labor assignment, in understaffing of the 
shift he supervised, [and] in being subject to constant verbal 
warnings . . . he references fifty paragraphs of his additional 
statement of uncontested facts without even bothering to specify 
which paragraphs contain the relevant facts as to each of the four 
types of disparate treatment alleged therein."  Id.  Not just that, 
but he also "fail[ed] to discuss any case law to support his 
contention."  Id.  The court thus found the argument waived.  Id.  
Finally, to the extent Sepúlveda argued the actions should be 
considered materially adverse when looked at together rather than 
individually, (thus comprising a hostile work environment), the 
court concluded otherwise, explaining that "[c]ollectively, these 
incidents amount to nothing more than the petty insults and minor 
annoyances which are insufficient to constitute an adverse 
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employment action under the ADA. . . . Drawing all reasonable 
inference in his favor, Sepúlveda did not demonstrate from an 
objective standpoint, that Caribbean's actions were sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to sustain a retaliatory hostile work 
environment, and so it fails."  Id. at *9 (quoting Colón-Fontánez, 
660 F.3d at 36-37). 
Our de novo standard of review fails to yield any genuine 
issue of material fact that would lead us to draw a conclusion 
that differs from the district court.  Because the court below got 
it right, we need not say anymore on the matter. 
Affirmed. 
 
